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Petitioner Lorin Blauer submits the following closing brief in connection with his 
petition for review of the decision of the Career Service Review Board on June 28, 2006 
herein, and its denial of Petitioner's Request for Reconsideration thereof dated July 27, 
2006. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PETITIONER DID NOT FAIL TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTING CSRB'S FACTUAL FINDINGS 
Respondents first take issue with whether Petitioner has adequately "marshaled the 
evidence" in support of CSRB's June 28, 2006 decision. 
Petitioner recognizes that, under Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the party challenging factual findings of an administrative body is required to 
marshal evidence in support of those findings. See also Chen v. Stewart, 2004 Utah 82 at 
^ 26, 100 P.3d 1177. The Court is referred, in this regard, to pages 14-15 of his Opening 
Brief, and the citations to the record contained therein, as well as the citations to the 
record and explanation set out in CSRB's own decision and final agency action, appended 
as Attachment 1 to Petitioner's Opening Brief. Respondents take issue that Petitioner 
failed to account for "every scrap of competent evidence supporting CSRB's decision," 
and accuse him of actually omitting "considerable evidence supporting that decision." 
Yet Respondents themselves identify only a handful of supposed bases for the CSRB 
decision. These will be dealt with in turn. 
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Respondents claim that "Blauer omits significant evidence of the nature of his job 
duties that support CSRB's findings that the same position was held open for him" 
(Opposing Brief at p. 18). There is no evidence supporting this proposition. It is 
undisputed in the record that, before "reassignment," the conducting of administrative 
hearings full-time was never part of his "job description" - see Petitioner's Statement of 
Facts at |^ 7-15 (Petitioner's Opening Brief at pp. 5-8). At best, he was assigned to 
conduct two hearings per week, 10% of his total workload. See Petitioner's Statement of 
Facts at % 15 (Petitioner's Opening Brief at pp. 7-8). Respondents cite no evidence in the 
record to refute this, nor was any such competent evidence adduced before CSRB. 
Respondents fault Petitioner for failing to note to this Court that "90% or more of 
the hearings Blauer conducted were done telephonically with a speaker phone, so Blauer 
would not have been confined to a stationary position during the hearings but could have 
walked around or alternated between sitting and standing." The problem with this 
assertion is that it was not articulated by any of DWS's witnesses as direct basis for 
Petitioner's termination, or as a basis for his termination (Agency Exhibit 7, R. 895); 
rather, he was terminated for attempting to impose conditions of any sort upon his return 
from long-term disability leave (R. 893 at 9:18 - 56:9 and Agency Exhibits 1-7 (R. 895)); 
(R. 893 at 114:24 - 115:6). Indeed, Petitioner presented unrefuted evidence that the 
conducting of administrative hearings full-time - whether sitting, standing or any 
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combination of the two - would have had a crippling effect on Petitioner. See 
Petitioner's Statement of Facts at ffij 18-20 (Petitioner's Opening Brief at pp. 8-9). 
Respondents fault Petitioner for failing to bring to this Court's attention the fact of 
a prior ruling, in separate litigation, that his "reassignment" to do administrative hearings 
full-time was not a "demotion" under governing law. The Court is invited to search the 
record from beginning to end for any evidence that CSRB's decision and final agency 
action of June 28, 2006 was, or could in any way have been, based in whole or in part on 
this determination. Petitioner was terminated for the reasons set out in DWS' letter of 
November 3, 2004 (Agency Exhibit 7, R. 895); Petitioner need not buy into DWS' post-
termination inventions of alternative grounds in order to "marshal the evidence". 
With respect to the assertion that Petitioner failed to bring this Court's attention to 
the fact that his termination was based, in part, on his failure to furnish a medical release, 
the Court is referred to U 37B of Petitioner's Statement of Facts (Petitioner's Opening 
Brief at p. 15), and in particular to his November 3, 2004 termination letter (Agency 
Exhibit 7, R 895). DWS has invented the medical release argument out of whole cloth to 
justify its actions retrospectively. Petitioner certainly acknowledges the content of a letter 
submitted as Agency Exhibit 5 (included in ^ 37B of Petitioner's Statement of Facts); the 
issue, however, was that in her letter of October 1, 2004, HR Director Joanne Campbell 
was demanding that Petitioner provide a "medical release" certifying him as fit to conduct 
administrative law hearings full-time, something which he had repeatedly told 
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Respondents that he could not do. Rather than making this demand, it was incumbent 
upon DWS to afford Petitioner rights guaranteed under R. 477-7-17(3)(b), and offer to 
reassign him to "one or more immediately available vacant positions, for which the 
employee qualifies, and whose essential functions the employee is able to perform 
without a reasonable accommodation." Throughout this proceeding, DWS has carefully 
sidestepped the obligation which it disregarded in this respect. 
Finally, in a footnote on page 23 of their Opposing Brief, Respondents fault 
Petitioner for failing to include "evidence of accommodations made by the department for 
Blauer's physical condition," relying on recommendations by the state ergonomic 
specialist. It is noteworthy that the state ergonomic specialist was never called to testify 
in this matter, nor was his report properly considered under the "residuum" rule discussed 
at Point II below. Testimony from Dr. Dennis Peterson was the only competent medical 
evidence placed before CSRB. 
POINT II 
PETITIONER'S TERMINATION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
In claiming that Petitioner's termination was supported by "substantial evidence in 
the record," Respondents continue to harp on the proposition that, because the holding of 
administrative law hearings was one of the "core functions" of his position, DWS's 
demand that he perform that "core function" full-time was fully justified, and that his 
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inability to do so due to medical disability was irrelevant. The argument ignores two 
critical factors. 
First, the term "core function" is nowhere defined in state law or the administrative 
code. It is a term of convenience, fabricated by Respondents in conjunction with legal 
proceedings surrounding Petitioner's "reassignment" and firing, apparently to justify 
DWS's actions. The relevant inquiry under R. 477-7-17(3), Utah Administrative Code, 
has nothing to do with "core functions". It is, instead, whether or not Petitioner could, 
with or without reasonable accommodation, perform the essential functions of his job. 
For those reasons addressed in Petitioner's Opening Brief, the defining of full-time 
administrative hearings as an "essential function" of his position as Legal/Enforcement 
Counsel III is belied by 23 years of personal history. 
Second, testimony before CSRB was uncontroverted that Petitioner suffered from 
both psychopathological and physiological disabilities, precluding him from conducting 
administrative law hearings full-time. The fact that Petitioner was approved for long-
term disability, by a separate state agency, for psychological reasons only does not alter 
this fact. At the conclusion of his disability period, Petitioner was entitled to rights 
guaranteed under the Utah Administrative Code - rights completely sidestepped by DWS 
in deciding to terminate him. 
Indeed, both DWS and CSRB base their contention that Petitioner was only 
psychologically disabled upon one source: a written report from Dr. Darrell H. Hart, 
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Ph.D. Dr. Hart's report, without his testimony at the hearing, constituted hearsay. While 
hearsay is admissible in administrative hearing, it cannot form the sole basis of CSRB's 
findings. This is so due to the "residuum" rule applicable in administrative hearing. That 
rule was recently stated in the case of Taft v. Draper City, 2006 Utah App. 315,2006 
WL2089967, in which the court stated the following: 
Hearsay evidence is admissible in proceedings before administrative 
agencies. However, findings of fact cannot be based exclusively on hearsay 
evidence. They must be supported by a residuum of legal evidence 
competent in a court of law. 
2006 Utah App. 315 at |^ 2. See also, Beehive Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm. of 
Utah, 2004 Utah 18, 89 P.3d 131; Hoskings v. Ind. Comm. of Utah, 918 P.2d 150 (Ct. of 
Appeals 1996). The only "residuum" of competent evidence before the Court was the 
testimony of Dr. Dennis Peterson, who clearly stated that Petitioner was disabled - for 
both physiological and psychological reasons - from performing administrative law 
hearings full time, but could perfectly well resume his activities as Legal/Enforcement 
Counsel III - a position which, even if considered, Dr. Hart's report sustains completely 
(Agency Exh. 2, R. 895, p. 13, U 2).1 
Concerning DWS's ongoing claim that Petitioner was obliged to furnish, and 
failed to furnish, a "medical release," the Court is referred to p. 3, above: As stated by his 
counsel, Petitioner was still unable to return to the job duties demanded of him at the time 
1
 The "residuum rule" also disqualifies Respondents' attempted reliance on 
recommendations of the state ergonomic specialist - see Opposing Brief at p. 23, fh.5. 
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of his departure (the holding of administrative law hearings full-time). From both 
psychological and physiological aspects, Petitioner could not obtain a "medical release" 
under these circumstances, as his physician explained at length on the stand. He was, 
however, able to return to the work which he had done for 23 years, as his counsel 
explained on October 4, 2004. At this point, state law mandated that DWS afford 
Petitioner the rights guaranteed under R. 477-7-17(3). No evidence in the record even 
hints that DWS undertook any of the required steps thereunder. And again, the Court is 
referred to Petitioner's letter of termination (Agency Exhibit 7, R. 895), which nowhere 
cites Petitioner for failing to produce a medical release. 
POINT III 
CSRB INCORRECTLY APPLIED THE LAW GOVERNING PETITIONER'S 
RIGHTS UPON EXHAUSTION OF LEAVE 
In response to Petitioner's argument that CSRB incorrectly applied the law in 
determining that Petitioner's termination was proper (Petitioner's Opening Brief at 
pp. 18-23), Respondents can offer nothing but the excuse that, because he went on 
disability for "psychological reasons", and because he did not produce a "medical 
release" to return to the exact duties which he had been unable to perform in the first 
place, DWS acted properly. The argument is a mystery, and completely ignores the plain 
wording of R. 477-7-17(3)(b). DWS had been amply supplied, for an extended period, 
with medical evidence documenting the fact that Petitioner could not - for physiological 
and psychological reasons - conduct administrative hearings full-time. Upon his return, 
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the law required DWS to treat this situation as a disability, and to make available to 
Petitioner any vacancies which his disability would permit him to fill with reasonable 
accommodation. DWS made no effort to fulfill this requirement, and CSRB made no 
effort to hold DWS to it. 
POINT IV 
PETITIONER DID NOT "WAIVE" A CHALLENGE TO CSRB'S DECISION 
DENYING RECONSIDERATION 
At pages 27-28 of their Opposing Brief, Respondents claim that, by failing to 
argue the substance of CSRB's denial of Petitioner's request for reconsideration, 
Petitioner has "waived" any challenge thereto. 
The Court is invited to review CSRB's ruling on Petitioner's request for 
reconsideration (Opening Brief at Attachment 2). It has no substance beyond the claim 
that the request was untimely, which Petitioner challenged at Point III of his Opening 
Brief (see Petitioner's Opening Brief at pp. 30-35). 
POINT V 
THIS COURT DOES NOT LACK SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
Finally, Respondents have failed to dislodge the fact that this Court's subject 
matter jurisdiction over this petition is established by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(a), 
relating to "the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of 
state agencies". This is confirmed by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16. Petitioner pursued 
this petition within thirty days of CSRB's "final agency action" - the temporal 
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prerequisite to this Court's jurisdiction. Respondents have cited this Court to no case in 
which a delay in seeking reconsideration of an agency order has barred a Utah Appellate 
Court from exercising its jurisdiction, nor would such holding promote the interest of 
justice or resolution of claims on their merits, the ultimate goal and policy of the law. 
Sulzen v. Williams, 1999 Utah App. 76, 977 P.2d 497; Meyers v. Interwest Corp., 632 
P.2d 879 (Utah 1981). For those reasons more fully set out in his opening brief, 
Petitioner submits that the jurisdiction of this Court is proper, and that the conduct of 
Respondents should be dealt with on the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
For those reasons set out above, as well as those in his Opening Brief, Petitioner 
submits that he was improperly terminated as a DWS employee, and is entitled to 
reinstatement with an order of back-pay. 
DATED this 18th day of April, 2007. 
JONES WALDO H^LBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
By y ^ 
Vincent C. Rampton 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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